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Workers’ Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
and J. Benson Ward**
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2018–2019 survey period featured important legislative changes
as well as interesting decisions of the appellate courts addressing
workers’ compensation issues on such wide-ranging topics as scheduled
break exceptions, the Insolvency Pool, and occupational diseases. 1
II. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
The legislative package drafted by the Advisory Council of the State
Board of Workers’ Compensation passed through both legislative
chambers and effects multiple changes in the Workers’ Compensation
Act.2 The statutory maximum for Temporary Total Disability benefits
under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2613 increased from $575 to $675 for injuries
occurring after July 1, 2019, and the statutory maximum for Temporary
Partial Disability benefits under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2624 increased from
$383 to $450 per week for injuries occurring after July 1, 2019. The
maximum compensation payable to a surviving spouse in the event of a
death claim under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-265(d)5 similarly increased to
$270,000.

*Partner, Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory University (B.A.,
1977); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1980). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**Partner, Drew, Eckl & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.A.,
summa cum laude, 2002); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2005).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of workers’ compensation during the prior survey period, see H.
Michael Bagley & J. Benson Ward, Workers’ Compensation, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 289 (2018).
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1–34-9-432 (2019).
3. O.C.G.A § 34-9-261 (2019).
4. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-262 (2019).
5. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-265(d) (2019).
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The legislative changes created notable exceptions such as the
400-week cap on medical treatment in non-catastrophic claims.6
Effective July 1, 2019, an injured worker that is not catastrophically
injured will be entitled to limited medical benefits beyond the 400-week
cap to the extent that prosthetic devices, spinal cord stimulators, and
certain durable medical equipment may require maintenance or repair
where such durable medical equipment “was originally furnished within
400 weeks of the date of injury or occupational disease.” 7 “Durable
medical equipment” is defined as “an apparatus that provides
therapeutic benefits, is primarily and customarily used to serve a
medical purpose, and is reusable and appropriate for use in the home,”
and includes “wheelchairs, beds and mattresses, traction equipment,
canes, crutches, walkers, oxygen, and nebulizers.”8 “Prosthetic device” is
defined as “an artificial device that has, in whole or in part, replaced a
joint lost or damaged or other body part lost or damaged as a result of
an injury or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of
employment.”9
This amendment became effective July 1, 2019, but, as worded,
purports to apply to all injuries that are not catastrophic which arose on
or after July 1, 2013, and consequently, it is retroactive in application. 10
This raises an interesting question, as “generally statutes prescribe for
the future and that is the construction to be given unless there is a
clear contrary intention shown.”11 However, “where a statute governs
only procedure of the courts, including the rules of evidence, it is to be
given retroactive effect absent an expressed contrary intention.” 12
Retroactive effect is also given to statutes affecting the remedy only,
rather than the right to which the remedy attaches. 13 “In order to
decide whether [a] statute should be given prospective or retrospective
effect, the statute must be examined to determine whether it is
substantive in nature or” is procedural in nature.14 Arguably this
amendment does “not [deal] with the compensability of claims but
[rather] with the scope of the remedy” for claims already deemed to be
6. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200 (2019).
7. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a)(3)(A)(i) (2019).
8. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a)(3)(B)(i) (2019).
9. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2019).
10. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a)(2) (2019).
11. Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54, 55, 365 S.E.2d 273, 273 (1988).
12. Id.
13. Pritchard v. Savannah St. & Rural Resort R.R. Co., 87 Ga. 294, 298–99, 13 S.E.
493, 495 (1891); Glover v. Colbert, 210 Ga. App. 666, 668, 437 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1993).
14. Barnes v. City of Atlanta Police Dep’t, 219 Ga. App. 139, 141, 464 S.E.2d 609, 611
(1995); see also Glover, 210 Ga. App. at 669, 437 S.E.2d at 365.
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compensable, and under this argument the effect would be remedial
and possibly allow for retroactive effect.15
III. INTOXICATION AND DRUG TESTING
In Lingo v. Early County Gin, Inc.,16 the Georgia Court of Appeals
evaluated whether the employer met the requirements to trigger the
rebuttable presumption of intoxication. 17 The claimant worked at a
cotton gin company, directing drivers “into a loading dock area where
he would then assist in unloading modules of unginned cotton onto a
platform.”18 When a truck, lacking a functional back-up beeper,
reversed into the loading dock, the claimant failed to see or hear the
truck and was crushed against the dock, incurring multiple injuries
requiring hospitalization.19 The employer sent a lab technician “to the
hospital to obtain a urine sample” from the claimant for a post-injury
drug test; however the claimant was undergoing surgery so “the
technician was not [allowed] in the operating room,” and instead she
told an operating room nurse of her need for a sample and the nurse
returned with a urine sample.20 The technician did not have “first-hand
knowledge of who collected the sample,” which returned to show the
presence of cannabinoid metabolites.21
Based on the drug test results, the employer denied the claim on
grounds that under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17(b)22 it was entitled to the
rebuttable presumption that the injury was caused by the claimant’s
illegal marijuana use and intoxication.23 The administrative law judge
(ALJ) found that the employer was unable to rely on the statute’s
rebuttable presumption because it did not offer proof of who obtained
the sample or otherwise establish that initial link in the chain of
custody, ruled that the employer was otherwise unable to prove
intoxication to bar the claim, and awarded the claimant benefits. 24 The
Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation (the
Appellate Division) reversed, holding that the “defect in the chain of

15. Barnes, 219 Ga. App. at 141, 464 S.E.2d at 611.
16. 346 Ga. App. 92, 816 S.E.2d 54 (2018), cert. denied, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 27 (Ga. Jan.
7, 2019).
17. Id. at 92, 816 S.E.2d at 56.
18. Id. at 93, 816 S.E.2d at 56.
19. Id. at 93, 816 S.E.2d at 56–57.
20. Id. at 93, 816 S.E.2d at 57.
21. Id. at 93–94, 816 S.E.2d at 57.
22. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-17(b) (2019).
23. Lingo, 346 Ga. App. at 92, 816 S.E.2d at 56.
24. Id. at 95, 816 S.E.2d at 57.
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custody went to the weight of the evidence” and not to its admissibility,
and held that the employer could “avail itself of the [statute’s]
rebuttable presumption and that” the claimant did not rebut the
presumption that the “injuries were caused by his use of marijuana,”
and the superior court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.25
The court of appeals ruled that the lab technician’s absence from the
collection of the specimen, and the employer’s inability to show that the
sample was taken by a person who was authorized under O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-415(d)26 to collect a sample, prevented the employer from
triggering the rebuttable presumption of intoxication in O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-17(b).27 The court observed that chain of custody issues in a
criminal context are different from those in a workers’ compensation
claim, and inapplicable.28 Accordingly, as the requirements for O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-17(b)’s rebuttable presumption were not met, the court “vacate[d]
the order of the superior court and remand[ed] to the Appellate Division
for” a determination as to whether the employer had otherwise carried
its burden of proving that the claimant was intoxicated and the
intoxication caused the accident.29 In a special concurrence, Judge
Bethel noted that the failure to fully comply with O.C.G.A. § 34-9-415’s
requirements should go to the weight of the drug test evidence and not
its admissibility.30
IV. INGRESS–EGRESS ON SCHEDULED BREAKS
The court of appeals issued two decisions during this survey period
addressing the intersection of the ingress and egress rule and the
regularly scheduled break exception.
In Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers’ Compensation,31 the
claimant worked as an insurance claims associate and had mandatory
unpaid daily lunch breaks, which were on a staggered schedule, and
during the scheduled breaks the associates logged out of the phone
system and could do as they pleased, including leaving the office for
lunch. On the day in question, when the claimant’s scheduled lunch
break began, she walked to the employer’s breakroom to microwave her
food. She slipped on water and fell while she was in the breakroom,
injuring herself. The Appellate Division denied her workers’
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 95, 816 S.E.2d at 57–58.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-415(d) (2019).
Lingo, 346 Ga. App at 96–97, 816 S.E.2d at 58–59.
Id. at 97, 816 S.E.2d at 59.
Id. at 98, 816 S.E.2d at 59.
Id. at 98–99, 816 S.E.2d at 60 (Bethel, J., concurring).
348 Ga. App. 30, 821 S.E.2d 132 (2018).
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compensation claim because it occurred while she was on a scheduled
lunch break.32
The ALJ found that the claim was compensable and awarded
benefits, based on a prior court of appeals decision, Rockwell v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.,33 which held that while injuries occurring
during a regularly scheduled break are generally not compensable,
injuries occurring on the employer’s premises during periods of
reasonable “ingress and egress” to and from those premises are
compensable.34 The Appellate Division “reversed the ALJ’s award,
concluding that [the] injury did not arise out of her employment
because it occurred [during her] ‘regularly scheduled break’” while
“[she] was leaving to attend to ‘a purely personal matter[,]” and the
superior court affirmed.35
The issue facing the court of appeals was whether the ingress and
egress rule would serve as an exception to the general application of the
regularly scheduled break exclusion.36 The scheduled break exception
originates from a 1935 Georgia Supreme Court decision, 37 and the rule
is based on the idea that an injury does not arise out of the
employment, but rather out of an employee’s individual pursuit, when it
occurs during a regularly scheduled break time when the employee is
free to use the time as the employee so chooses. 38 The scheduled break
exception applies even when the injury occurs within working hours
and on the employer’s premises. 39 On the other hand, the ingress and
egress rule allows for the employee to have a reasonable time to enter
or leave the employer’s premises “‘on the rationale that until the
employee has departed the premises, he has not started traveling a
route of his choosing wholly disconnected with his employment.’”40 The
court of appeals noted that in its decision in Rockwell, it applied the
ingress and egress rule “to an employee leaving for a scheduled lunch
break,” when “[t]he employee fell while traveling across a walkway on

32. Id. at 30, 821 S.E.2d at 133–34.
33. 248 Ga. App. 73, 545 S.E.2d 121 (2001).
34. Frett, 348 Ga. App. at 30, 821 S.E.2d at 134; Rockwell, 248 Ga. App. at 73, 545
S.E.2d at 122.
35. Frett, 348 Ga. App. at 30–31, 821 S.E.2d at 133–34.
36. Id. at 31, 821 S.E.2d at 134.
37. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266, 178 S.E. 728 (1935).
38. Frett, 348 Ga. App. at 31–32, 821 S.E.2d at 134–35.
39. Id. at 33, 821 S.E.2d at 135.
40. Id. at 34, 821 S.E.2d at 136 (quoting Hill v. Omni Hotel at CNN Ctr., 268 Ga.
App. 144, 147, 601 S.E.2d 472, 474 (2004)).
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her way to a parking lot” because she was in the process of leaving her
employer’s premises when the injury occurred.41
The court noted that the case law at “the intersection of the ingress
and egress rule [and] the scheduled break rule [has led to] anomalous
and arbitrary results” and conflicting decisions. 42 The court of appeals
deferred to the existing Georgia Supreme Court precedent laid down in
Farr and disapproved of the previous court of appeals holdings that
improperly diluted the regularly scheduled break exception by refusing
to apply the exception to situations of ingress or egress—the court
concluded that “any decision to apply the ingress and egress rule to the
scheduled break exception” should be made by the supreme court. 43
Accordingly, the court ruled that the claimant’s “injury did not arise out
of her employment” because it occurred while she was engaged in an
individual pursuit while on a scheduled lunch break during which time
“she was free to do as she pleased.” 44 The court observed that future
litigants would be best served by creating a bright-line rule and
eliminating the guesswork created by conflicting decisions—until the
supreme court rules on the issue, the ingress and egress rule does not
apply to the scheduled break exception.45
Similarly, while Frett was pending before the court of appeals, the
case of Daniel v. Bremen-Bowden Investment Company46 also went
before the court of appeals, essentially on the same issue involving the
collision of the ingress and egress rule and the scheduled break
exception.47 In that case, the claimant “left her work station for her
regularly scheduled lunch break,” during which time she was free to
spend her time as she wished, and was walking down a public sidewalk
to the company-owned parking lot when she tripped and fell, injuring
herself.48 The ALJ relied upon Rockwell to find that the ingress and
egress rule rendered the injury during the scheduled break
compensable.49 The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the
“injury did not arise out of her employment because it occurred while

41. Id. at 35, 821 S.E.2d at 136–37 (citing Rockwell, 248 Ga. App. at 73–74, 545
S.E.2d at 121).
42. Id. at 35, 821 S.E.2d at 137.
43. Id. at 36, 821 S.E.2d at 137.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 348 Ga. App. 803, 824 S.E.2d 698 (2019).
47. Id. at 803, 824 S.E.2d at 699.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 803–04, 824 S.E.2d at 699.
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she was on a regularly scheduled break,” and the superior court
affirmed.50
The court of appeals observed the parallel but separate lines of
decisions involving the scheduled break exception and the ingress and
egress rule, which the court similarly traced in the Frett decision, before
observing that “during the pendency of the [present] appeal the [court
of appeals] disapproved Rockwell” and related decisions to hold in Frett
that the ingress and egress rule does not render compensable injuries
that occur while the employee is leaving and returning to work on a
regularly scheduled lunch break. 51 Under Frett’s new bright-line rule,
the Appellate Division’s decision was affirmed.52
V. INSOLVENCY POOL
The claimant in Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Dubose 53 was
injured in a car accident arising out of and occurring in the course of
her employment.54 In addition to filing a workers’ compensation claim,
the claimant also filed a claim against the other driver’s automobile
liability policy and against two uninsured/underinsured motorist
coverage policies, and all of those claims settled. She also filed claims
under two personal disability policies, one of which was denied and the
other of which paid her monthly benefits. 55
Approximately two years after the accident, her employer’s workers’
compensation insurance company was placed into liquidation and the
Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool (the Pool) took over responsibility for
the administration of her claim. 56 The Pool then filed a declaratory
judgment action, seeking a ruling:
[T]hat the exhaustion provision of the Georgia Insurer’s Insolvency
Pool Act (the Pool Act)57 . . . required that any proceeds that [the
claimant] received from other solvent insurance carriers (including
settlements from the automobile liability insurance . . and her own
uninsured/underinsured policies, as well as benefits received under

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 805, 824 S.E.2d at 700.
Id.
349 Ga. App. 238, 825 S.E.2d 606 (2019).
Id. at 238, 825 S.E.2d at 608.
Id. at 240, 825 S.E.2d at 609.
Id. at 239–40, 825 S.E.2d at 609.
O.C.G.A. § 33-36-14 (2019).
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[the claimant’s] disability policy) should reduce her claim against the
Pool by the full amounts received.58

“The trial court denied the Pool’s motion for summary judgment,
holding that [the exhaustion provision contained in] O.C.G.A.
§ 33-36-14(a) limited ‘the offset to money recovered for lost wages and
medical expenses,’” that is limited it to “claims that could be made
under the [Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act].” 59 Both parties
appealed, with the Pool arguing that its offset should not be so limited,
and the claimant arguing that the Pool was entitled to no offset at all.60
In its appeal, the Pool argued that its offset should not be limited to
amounts received by the claimant specific to lost wages and medical
expenses, as the Pool’s “obligations do not arise . . . until the amounts
owed under the workers’ compensation claim exceed the amount paid
out by all other solvent insurers, regardless of” whether the solvent
policies provided workers’ compensation insurance coverage or other
insurance coverage.61 The court of appeals observed that the “Pool is a
non-profit legal entity created by the Georgia General Assembly” to
provide “a limited safety net for insurers that experience liquidation.” 62
Part of this limited safety net is delineated in the Pool Act’s exhaustion
provision, O.C.G.A. § 33-36-14, which requires a claimant “to exhaust
certain sources of insurance coverage before seeking any payment of his
or her claim from the” Pool.63 The exhaustion provision provides in
pertinent part as follows:
[A]ny person having a claim against a policy . . . issued by an
insolvent insurer, which claim is a covered claim and is also a claim
within the coverage of any policy issued by a solvent insurer, shall be
required to exhaust first his or her rights under such policy issued by
the solvent insurer. The policy of the solvent insurer shall be treated
as primary coverage and the policy of the insolvent insurer shall be
treated as secondary coverage and his or her rights to recover such
claim under this chapter shall be reduced by any amounts received
from the solvent insurers.64

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Dubose, 349 Ga. App. at 238, 825 S.E.2d at 608.
Id. at 238–39, 825 S.E.2d at 608.
Id. at 239, 825 S.E.2d at 608.
Id. at 240, 825 S.E.2d at 609 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 241, 825 S.E.2d at 609.
Id. at 241, 825 S.E.2d at 610.
Id. at 241–42, 825 S.E.2d at 610 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-36-14(a) (2019)).
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The issue before the court involved the definition of the term “claim”
contained in the statute.65 The Pool argued that the claimant’s
“personal injury and disability claims arose from the same” accident
and therefore “the Pool’s obligation for workers’ compensation benefits
should be offset by [the claimant’s] recovery under the other, solvent,
insurance policies.”66 Whereas, the claimant argued that the “claim
should be interpreted more narrowly to include only ‘claims for the
types of damages that are the Pool’s responsibility’”—such as workers’
compensation benefits—and “her workers’ compensation claim [was]
not a ‘claim within the coverage’ of the other solvent policies.” 67 This is
“because it is not under an insurance policy that covers the same
liability and risks that are covered by the policies of the solvent
insurers,” and so at least a portion of her settlement proceeds from the
“solvent insurers involve damages not available under the workers’
compensation system” and are not subject to the offset.68
In addressing this issue, the court of appeals cited to decisions from
other states addressing insolvent insurance companies, which “support
the Pool’s contention that the coverage provided by [a] solvent carrier
does not have to be the exact same type of coverage provided by the
insolvent carrier”—that is, that in determining the meaning of “claim”
in the exhaustion provision there was no distinguishing between a
workers’ compensation claim and a tort claim. 69 The court held that
“O.C.G.A. § 33-36-14(a) does not require the policies of the solvent and
insolvent carriers to provide identical coverage,” and so the automobile
liability insurance policy and uninsured/underinsured motorist policies
were primary to the Pool coverage as they paid claims within the
coverage of the policies arising from the accident; therefore, “the Pool
[was] entitled to offset the amounts recovered from the GEICO
automobile liability policy and the State Farm uninsured/underinsured
motorist policies.”70
The court then held that the exhaustion provision “allows the Pool to
offset claims that are ‘within the coverage of any policy issued by the
solvent insurer,’” and the trial court incorrectly limited the offset to
amounts specifically received for lost wages and medical expenses. 71 The
policies from the solvent insurer and insolvent insurer do not need to

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 241, 825 S.E.2d at 610.
Id. at 242, 825 S.E.2d at 610.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 243–44, 825 S.E.2d at 611–12.
Id. at 240, 825 S.E.2d at 609.
Id. at 245–46, 825 S.E.2d at 612 (emphasis omitted).
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provide the same type of coverage and the amounts paid by the solvent
carrier do not have to be at issue under the insolvent carrier’s policy.72
Therefore, because the claimant’s “automobile liability policy and . . .
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage arise from the automobile
collision from which her workers’ compensation claim arose,” the Pool
was entitled to an offset for the money that the claimant received under
these policies.73 The record in the case was unclear as to whether
payments received under the disability policy compensated the claimant
for losses that were related to the automobile collision, and so the court
remanded the case for the trial court’s analysis of those payments and
whether any such claims are within the coverage of the disability
policies pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-36-14(a).74
VI. EVIDENCE IN SEEKING CATASTROPHIC DESIGNATION
The court of appeals evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence
submitted in a request for “catastrophic” designation in McCrary v.
Employee’s Retirement System Of Georgia.75 The claimant in that case
worked for several years as a customer service specialist, which
required her to take incoming calls, type up information, and enter data
into a computer system.76 “During the course of her employment . . . ,
[her] right hand became swollen and painful,” and the claimant
received treatment and two surgeries in 2011 but still “could not type or
use her right hand very well.”77 The claimant did not return to work due
to her lingering pain “and was terminated for [failure] to return to work
when asked.”78 She twice applied for Social Security Disability Income
Benefits but was denied both times. 79 In 2015, her authorized treating
physician issued an opinion that the claimant’s disability was
permanent and she was “unable to type for any length of time,” and her
claim was accepted as compensable and benefits were paid. 80
The claimant later requested designation of her injury as
“catastrophic,” which was contested by the employer. 81 At the hearing
before the ALJ, the claimant tendered a doctor’s report from 2012,
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 246, 825 S.E.2d 612–13.
Id. at 246–47, 825 S.E.2d at 613.
Id. at 247, 825 S.E.2d at 613.
349 Ga. App. 466, 825 S.E.2d 896 (2019).
Id. at 466, 825 S.E.2d at 897.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 467, 825 S.E.2d at 897.
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which opined that the claimant would “probably never be able to return
to work with any reasonable function of the right upper extremity. At
best, the patient could return to work with no use of the right upper
extremity on a permanent basis.”82 She “also tendered a November 2012
functional capacities evaluation (FCE) report, in which the examiner
found her to be ‘employable in a [s]edentary physical demand level, but
the job must not require more than 30% use of her right upper
extremity during the workday.’”83 Further, her vocational expert
testified that the claimant “was unable to do any work for which she[]
[was] qualified that exist[ed] in substantial numbers.” 84 However, on
cross-examination, the claimant’s vocational expert testified the
claimant could return to work if she was able to perform a job without
using her right upper extremity, that it was unlikely for a “high school
educated and computer literate [person] to find a job in the
metropolitan Atlanta area” with no use of her dominant hand, and that
he did not consider that any advanced computer technologies might
make the claimant employable.85
“The ALJ found that the [claimant did not] carry her burden of
proving that she sustained a catastrophic injury as defined in O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-200.1(g)(6)(A),” and the Appellate Division made some
modifications to the “findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . but
adopted the ALJ’s conclusion that the [claimant] had failed to
demonstrate a catastrophic injury,” and the superior court affirmed. 86
On appeal, the court of appeals evaluated the Appellate Division’s
and ALJ’s weighing of the evidence and testimony, and noted that “the
weight and credibility of witness testimony remains solely within the
purview of the ALJ and the Board.”87 The court concluded that evidence
existed in the record which supported the ALJ discounting the
testimony of the claimant’s vocational expert, based in large part on the
expert’s agreement that the claimant could return to work if she was
able to perform a job without using her right hand.88 The claimant also
contended that it was error for the ALJ and Appellate Division to
consider her testimony regarding her two denied Social Security
Disability applications.89 The court disagreed, as ample other ground

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 467, 825 S.E.2d at 897–98.
Id. at 467, 825 S.E.2d at 898.
Id.
Id. at 467–68, 825 S.E.2d at 898.
Id. at 470–71, 825 S.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 471, 825 S.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 472, 825 S.E.2d at 900.
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existed to support the ALJ’s and Appellate Division’s finding of no
catastrophic injury, including the expert witness testimony and medical
records.90 Moreover, the Social Security Administration’s decisions were
testified to by the claimant, and “the ALJ and the [Appellate Division]
based their . . . decisions on [her] failure to present credible evidence
that there were no jobs for her in the national economy.”91 Thus, since
“[t]he [Social Security Administration’s] decisions were not relevant to
that issue,” the court concluded that there was no error in affirming the
decision of the Appellate Division. 92
VII. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
The plaintiff in Savannah Hospitality Services, LLC v. Scriven 93 sued
his employer for denying him medical care for injuries he sustained in a
car accident while driving a company vehicle.94 He “alleg[ed] that he
was employed by both” Savannah Hospitality Services and
Southeastern Airport Services, Inc. on the date of accident “as a
maintenance worker and airport shuttle driver,” and so Savannah
Hospitality Services moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
workers’ compensation provided the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy,
including for any claim that the employer’s conduct exacerbated the
plaintiff’s injuries.95 The trial court denied the motion and did not
address the exclusive remedy argument.96
On appeal, the court of appeals observed the well-settled law that the
Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for an
injured worker with respect to any claims against his employer. 97 “[T]he
parties dispute[d] whether [the plaintiff] was acting in the scope of his
employment at the time he was injured;”98 the court disposed of those
arguments by summarily concluding that the undisputed evidence
showed that the injury occurred in the course of the employment and
arose out of the employment due to the causal connection between his
job and exacerbation of the injury because of the employer’s alleged
denial of access to care.99 The court noted that the relevant inquiry was
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 471–72, 825 S.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 473, 825 S.E.2d at 901.
Id.
350 Ga. App. 195, 828 S.E.2d 423 (2019).
Id. at 195, 828 S.E.2d at 424.
Id. at 196–97, 828 S.E.2d at 424–25.
Id. at 196–97, 828 S.E.2d at 425.
Id. at 197, 828 S.E.2d at 425.
Id. at 198, 828 S.E.2d at 426.
Id. at 198, 828 S.E.2d at 426–27.
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the aggravation of the plaintiff’s injuries by his “employer’s alleged
negligence in ‘failing to provide access to medical insurance’”
information and precluding his seeking a medical opinion.100 Because
“the injury arose out of and in the course of [the] employment, the
[Georgia Workers’ Compensation] Act applied, and [the plaintiff’s tort]
claims against [his employer] were barred.”101
In JCG Farms of Alabama, LLC v. Morgan,102 the plaintiff brought a
tort suit against JCG Farms, the owner and controller of a chicken feed
manufacturing plant where the claimant worked and was injured in an
explosion.103 The plaintiff was employed by JCG Foods, and both JCG
Foods and JCG Farms are companies “in a complex corporate structure
of their parent company, Koch Foods,” and the two entities operate
separately. The plaintiff moved for “partial summary judgment as to
JCG Farms’ . . . exclusive remedy defense, . . . argu[ing] that JCG
Farms admitted in [discovery] that it was not the [plaintiff’s]
employer.”104 After addressing a discovery dispute, in which the trial
court refused to allow JCG Foods to contradict information and
documents indicating that JCG Farms was the plaintiff’s employer and
not JCG Foods, the court of appeals concluded that sufficient evidence
existed to support the trial court’s ruling; therefore, the court of appeals
affirmed the decision granting the plaintiff’s motion for partial
summary judgment as to JCG Farms’ defense that the exclusive remedy
provision barred the case.105
VIII. ATTORNEY’S FEES
In A. Garcia Trucking & Produce, LLC v. Sandoval,106 the claimant
worked as a delivery truck driver and, in October 2014, incurred an
injury to “his lower back and right leg while lifting a 50-pound box.”107
He allegedly reported the injury to his supervisor and was told by the
supervisor to go home and rest. After the claimant missed two to three
weeks of work, he was treated at a local clinic, and returned to work up
until March 2015, at which time he could no longer work due to pain.
The company accountant testified that during the summer prior to the
October 2014 injury, she had been giving the claimant injections with
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 198, 828 S.E.2d at 426.
Id. at 200, 828 S.E.2d at 427.
348 Ga. App. 629, 824 S.E.2d 87 (2019).
Id. at 629, 824 S.E.2d at 88.
Id. at 629–30, 824 S.E.2d at 88–89.
Id. at 632–33, 824 S.E.2d at 89–90.
349 Ga. App. 319, 826 S.E.2d 146 (2019).
Id. at 321, 826 S.E.2d at 147.
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medicine from Mexico for back pain. Additionally, the employer
presented testimony that the claimant informed the employer prior to
starting employment that he had back problems, and disputed any
notice of an accident or injury that occurred in October 2014.108
The ALJ found that the claimant proved an October 2014 accident
and injury, and that the employer had actual notice of the injury. 109 The
ALJ awarded assessed attorney’s fees based upon the employer’s
unreasonable defense that the claimant did not give notice of his injury,
and “awarded penalties based on [the employer’s] failure to controvert
[the] claim within 21 days of” notice of injury.110 The Appellate Division
agreed as to the compensable injury and notice, but held that attorney’s
fees were not warranted in light of conflicting evidence and testimony.
The superior court applied a de novo standard of review and reversed
the Appellate Division’s decision on attorney’s fees. 111
On appeal, the court of appeals observed that the Appellate
Division’s evaluation of “[w]hether an employer has unreasonably
defended against a claim is a factual determination [that is] subject to
the ‘any evidence’ standard of review,” and not a de novo standard of
review.112 The superior court emphasized the untimely controvert;
however “the ALJ awarded attorney[‘s] fees based on [the employer’s]
unreasonable defense” and not a late controvert, and the Appellate
Division did not address the untimely controvert in concluding that the
employer’s defense was not unreasonable. 113 Accordingly, the superior
court erred in reversing the Appellate Division’s decision. 114
IX. STANDARD OF REVIEW/OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
In McKenney’s, Inc. v. Sinyard,115 the court dealt with a claim for
occupational exposure to asbestos that led to a diagnosis of
mesothelioma. The claimant began working as a pipefitter in 1978 and
worked for McKenney’s from 1986 to 1989, subsequently working for
other employers.116 He was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2014 and
filed suit in Illinois state court naming more than eighty defendants,
including “companies and owners of premises where he worked . . . but
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 321, 826 S.E.2d at 147–48.
Id. at 322, 826 S.E.2d at 148.
Id.
Id. at 322–23, 826 S.E.2d at 148–49.
Id. at 323, 826 S.E.2d at 149.
Id. at 324, 826 S.E.2d at 149.
Id.
350 Ga. App. 260, 828 S.E.2d 639 (2019).
Id. at 261, 828 S.E.2d 642.
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he did not name McKenney’s as a defendant,” before dismissing without
prejudice and filing a Georgia workers’ compensation claim against
McKenney’s.117 McKenney’s argued that, as “it was not [the claimant’s]
employer when he was last injuriously exposed to asbestos,” under
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-284,118 it should not be liable.119 That statute provides
in pertinent part:
Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the
employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously
exposed to the hazards of such disease and the insurance carrier, if
any, by whom the employer was insured when such employee was
last so exposed under such employer shall alone be liable therefor,
without right of contribution from any prior employer or insurance
carrier.120

The claimant presented “evidence that he was injuriously exposed to
asbestos while working for McKenney’s,” medical evidence that the
asbestos exposure during this period caused his mesothelioma, and
testimony
that
“he
never
[subsequently]
worked
with
asbestos-containing materials or disturbed asbestos.”121
The ALJ found “that despite ‘abundant’ evidence of his injurious
exposure to asbestos with McKenney’s, [the claimant] failed to carry his
burden of proving” that McKenney’s was his employer when he was last
injuriously exposed to asbestos. 122 “The ALJ found that [the claimant’s]
allegations of injurious exposure to asbestos after his time with
McKenney’s, as raised in the Illinois lawsuit, were admissions in judicio
and
therefore
conclusive
and
binding
against
him,”
or
“[a]lternatively . . . could be used against [him] as admissions against
interest,” such that “the preponderance of evidence showed [his] last
injurious exposure to asbestos occurred after his time with
McKenney’s.”123 “The ALJ also found that there was ‘evidence to
support a finding that [the claimant] was injuriously exposed to
asbestos while working’” subsequent to his job with McKenney’s.124 The
Appellate Division affirmed the ALJ’s denial of the claim on grounds
“that [the claimant] did not carry his burden to prove McKenney’s . . .

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-284 (2019).
McKenney’s, 350 Ga. App. at 261, 828 S.E.2d at 642.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-284.
McKenney’s, 350 Ga. App. at 262, 828 S.E.2d at 642.
Id. at 262, 828 S.E.2d at 643.
Id.
Id.
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was his employer of last injurious exposure to asbestos,” though it
modified some of the ALJ’s findings. 125 The superior court reversed,
ruling in favor of the claimant.126
The superior court stated that it had applied the “any evidence”
standard to the [Appellate Division’s] factual findings and construed
the evidence in the light most favorable to McKenney’s, but because
the appeal related solely to a contention that the [Appellate Division]
erroneously applied the law to the undisputed facts, the superior
court would conduct a de novo review to determine whether the
Board applied the wrong legal standard to the evidence.127

The superior court ruled that the employer presented insufficient
evidence to establish that the claimant had later exposures to asbestos
as the employer “did not offer any expert opinion testimony to rebut
[the claimant’s expert’s] affirmative causation testimony, and . . . failed
to establish that any later exposure to asbestos was sufficiently
meaningful . . . to serve as legal causation of [the] mesothelioma.” 128
The superior court also ruled:
that mere evidence of exposure to asbestos, in the absence of
competent expert opinion . . . to establish [that] the exposure was
sufficiently meaningful to serve as a cause of the disease, failed to
meet the required legal standard to prove any later exposure was an
alternate cause . . . or amounted to an injurious exposure.129

Before the court of appeals, the employer argued “that the superior
court applied [an] incorrect standard of review,” as the employer “was
not required to produce its own expert to rebut [the claimant’s expert]
opinion testimony, and the [Appellate Division’s] finding that [the
claimant] failed to prove the identity of his employer of last injurious
exposure [was] supported by some evidence.” 130 The court of appeals
first held that some competent evidence existed to support the
Appellate Division’s finding that the claimant failed to meet his burden
of proving that McKenney’s was his last employer when he was last
injuriously exposed to asbestos, as the claimant’s Illinois lawsuit

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 263, 828 S.E.2d at 643.
Id. at 264, 828 S.E.2d at 644.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 264–65, 828 S.E.2d at 644.
Id. at 265, 828 S.E.2d at 644.
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included allegations of exposure to asbestos with subsequent
employers.131
Accordingly, “the [Appellate Division’s] decision must be upheld
unless it affirmatively appears that [it] committed an error of law,” and
the court of appeals determined that there was no error of law, as it
determined that the allegations in the claimant’s Illinois lawsuit—that
“[the claimant] was exposed to ‘great amounts’ of asbestos after his time
with McKenney’s . . . [which] caused his mesothelioma”—satisfied the
standard of causation evidence as it was “not incompetent or
speculative merely because it [was] not expert opinion evidence.”132 The
court further ruled that the employer “was not required to provide its
own expert on the issue of the employer of last injurious exposure,” as
toxic tort causation requirements are not categorical requirements in
workers’ compensation claims.133 As the Appellate Division’s findings
were not based on erroneous legal theories and were “‘supported by
some evidence, the superior court erred in reversing [the award].’” 134

131. Id. at 267, 828 S.E.2d at 646.
132. Id. at 270–71, 828 S.E.2d at 648.
133. Id. at 271, 828 S.E.2d at 648.
134. Id. at 273, 828 S.E.2d 649–50 (quoting JMJ Plumbing v. Cudihy, 319 Ga. App.
158, 163, 735 S.E.2d 148, 153 (2012)).
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